Venezuela's disputed election: an analysis.

Introduction

In late 2023 relations between the Venezuelan and United States (US) governments had taken a surprising turn for the better. The US relented and pulled back on some of it sanctions in return for free and fair elections in the Latin American state in July 2024.

Yet three weeks after the elections, we appear to be back were we were a year ago, in deadlock. The Venezuelan right-wing opposition and the government arguing over who is legitimate. While, in the streets, the poor, working and middle classes contemplate migrating or staying in a nation stagnating. The Biden administration, meanwhile, flounders. Caught between the demands of the Venezuelan opposition, US domestic politics in an election year and financial markets.

The election: in recap

On the night of the election the Venezuelan election authorities announced Maduro the president elect. The authority did not produce any data at this point, blaming a massive cyberattack. The same night, the opposition announced its candidate, Edmundo Gonzalez, as the winner. They supported this claim, first, with polling data they had done. And then later, publishing online the numbers it had collected from polling stations on election day.

Next we saw the US, and allied nations globally also question the official statements. They called out what they saw as the democratic backsliding and oppression of street protests that took place in the days after. The three centre-left nations in the region; Mexico, Brazil and Colombia; also noted the lack of transparency. But preferred to reserve judgement until after the official data was released.

But after three weeks it appears that we have reached an impasse. Maduro remains in the presidencial palace, Miraflores, with the opposition crying foul. The US led international community, meanwhile, looks on powerless.

Who won then?

The problem at the moment is that neither side has produced definite evidence of who actually won. The government has noted that the constitution grants them 30 days to do so. And in theory it should be hard for Maduro to cheat if the official data is released. Chiefly, as the election system is designed to prevent fraud. For example, it gives paper receipts along with computer tallies.

Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to believe that Maduro could have lost. Specifically, because after the decade long US enforced sanctions regime, the country has been devastated. Twenty five percent of the population has migrated, while the economy has contracted by eighty percent. But, Maduro is culpable too.

Maduro and the contradictions of the revolution.

As president, Maduro has not been able to reverse the failings of the Chavista revolution. Namely, the contradiction of a socialism built on an extractive capitalist model of petro-nationalism. Something apparent since the late 2000s. Instead, his government liberalised the economy further to counter the sanctions. And, as if to demonstrate the state’s slavish dedication to fossil fuel extraction, last year he threatened war with a neighbouring nation over oil exploration rights.

Further, Western media notes Maduro’s transformation of the state to retain power. The Financial Times (15/08/24:19) reported the security services reforms that have allowed him to build a powerful apparatus. One built on rewarding loyalty with promotion and corruption, while making coup attempts logistically difficult. Expedited, thanks to the help of the Cuban intelligence services.

In this environment it would not be hard to understand how Maduro could lose. Only the most loyal Chavista would not see the benefit for the movement to rebuild and reform during a period in opposition. After all, most of institutions of the state would remain loyal or close to Chavismo during that time.

That is apart from one factor, the right-wing opposition that has promised to liberalise further. A cost that would surely fall on the poorest. Therefore, we need to also look just as critically at the opposition's claims.

The opposition, the lackey of $$$.

The opposition have released their data, but there are issues here. Even a cursory glance at their polling data reveals questions about collecting agency’s bias and methodology. While an analysis of the data by US academic Walter Mabane does little to proof the veracity of their numbers. Furthermore, they refused to hand their data over to the Venezuelan supreme court, though this is not surprising.

Nevertheless, despite the opposition's lack of transparency we do know a few things. They are the US supported coalition, led by one Maria Corina. On the far right-wing, she is from a rich Caracas family and has deep ties to the US Regime Change Industrial complex (RCIC) in Venezuela such as Sumante, an organisation funded by the US Agency for International Development (USAID). And below is a photo of her meeting George Bush II. The latter, of course, was in charge when the US first tried to topple Chavez in 2004.

Corina, then, has worked for at least 20 years with the US in their shared goal. Needless to say, she is also a full on neoliberal. Her opinion piece in the Financial Times (23 July) days before the election attests to this. In it she noted the main polices of her right-wing coalition. First on the list was turning the nation into an energy hub, restructuring and paying off its foreign debt and restoring the rule of law.

In effect, what has come to be known as the Washington consensus. Numerous developing nations since since 1982 have undergone this policy, supervised by the IMF and World Bank. Essentially it transforms a nation into an export orientated economy, open to global trade. With a new set of loans, privatisation of state industries and massive cuts to welfare benefits, the market is supercharged creating a cadre of super-elites. After the latter gets their cut, global finance takes a huge chunk once the new debts are restructered. The meagre amount left is shared out amongst the working and middle classes.

The poor, though, suffer the most: abandoned by the state they are left to the markets that exploit them or reject them.

In fact, it is the same policy that impoverished the Venezuelan poor in the late 1980s, opening the doors for the Chavista movement’s first electoral win in 1998.

The opposition never learns.

With the above in mind, it is not hard to see how the Venezuelan supreme court found enough evidence to ban Corina from standing in the elections. This is how we ended up with Gonzalez on the ticket. And it is the opposition’s refusal to accept Corina’s ban that has led to the impasse we are in now.

As one Venezuelan pollster noted on twitter, it would appear that she has split from the Biden administration, if not the RCIC. Instead of rebuilding relations and trying to find a negotiated solution, she appears to be looking at the long term. Happy to admit defeat for now while sanctions continue to destroy the Venezuelan economy. A strategy she hopes will eventually lead to Maduro’s fall.

US policy: a shambles.

The US, meanwhile, backs the opposition, yet scrambles publicly for a policy that does not repeat Trump’s failures (FT 15/08/24:19). Torn between the Venezuelan opposition working with its own RCIC, balancing energy geopolitics in an election year and placating global finance eyeing Venezuela’s unpaid debts. This is shown by Blinken's comment the day after the election, questioning the Maduro win, that was partially walked back by a US State Department spokesman sometime later.

Nevertheless, despite the clarification of the Biden administration policy, it is clear that the RCIC is active. Perpetrating a massive psychological operation against Venezuela, as usual. The most visible manifestation has been all the anti-Maduro vitriol in the Western media. Even the strictly business Financial Times can’t help repeating misquotes and lies from The New York Times and sneering at Cuban interference. The latter betraying the reporters reliance on US government sources. Parallel, we saw a large cyberattack that started two weeks before the election. One that specifically targeted the Venezuelan election authorities. While we continue to see long time RCIC private sector agent’s legitimising the opposition's unverified data to the Western media.

Thus despite all the calls for democratic transparency by the US and the opposition, in reality they are equally lacking in the trust area.

This is truly a bad situation for Venezuela. Maduro is backed into a corner by the opposition and the Biden administration is unable to control the latter in a manner more convenient to their considerations.

For the Chavista regime, Maduro needs to go in a manner that allows the movement to reform while it still controls the wider organs of the state. The alternative is one where sanctions finally sink Maduro, allowing a right-wing coup d'etat to dislodge the Chavista state for an old-skool 90s neoliberal one.

Clearly the former is the preferred version. One that supporters from the left should encourage. Evermore so in a period when the US, distracted by domestic and global politics, is more amenable to negotiating a way out of the impasse.